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KEY POINTS 
• Post-Brexit food standards governance requires piecing together three new processes with very 
different – even opposite – implications.
o Retained EU law gives devolved nations independent control over domestic food standards and 
allows ministers to make new rules in these areas.
o Common frameworks aim to create harmonised food standards across the UK.
o The Internal Market Bill (IM Bill) makes it very difficult for devolved nations to restrict or impede 
imports from other devolved nations. 
• Putting these pieces together provides a picture that is unfavourable to the regulatory and political 
autonomy of Scotland and Wales.
• The IM Bill’s market access requirements could override agreed harmonised standards set out in 
common frameworks, which are cooperative and consultative rather than legislative.
• The IM Bill also undermines permitted devolution as England’s larger size and market power may 
make it difficult for devolved nations to maintain different regulations. Key IM Bill requirements 
also apply to imported goods, suggesting that devolved nations would not be able to ban or restrict 
products admitted as a result of new Free Trade Agreements. 
• House of Lords' amendments address some of these problems by strengthening common frameworks 
and reducing the discretionary power of the Secretary of State to amend key elements of the Bill.
• The core of any approach to an internal market as integrated as the UK’s should clearly be 
harmonised rules with a strong joint consultative process underlying them. 
• Strengthening common frameworks would be an important step toward preserving the Union post-
Brexit; primary legislation for core food standards areas, developed through an intergovernmental 
approach, is another route to providing a legislative basis for more harmony in food standards across 
the nations of the UK.
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INTRODUCTION
Food standards raise important questions about how 
the UK will govern future trade, not only with other 
countries but also between the nations of the UK: the 
so-called internal market. Widespread public concern 
about weakening food standards1 is being managed 
differently by the UK’s constituent governments, with 
a clear rift between England and Scotland. Thus, 
food standards have become an existential issue, 
threatening to determine what an independent United 
Kingdom looks like – and even whether it will be 
possible to refer to it as ‘united’.
As well as being politically-charged, food standards 
are highly technical. Post-Brexit food policy and 
legislation reveals significant changes to both how, 
and also where, regulation takes place. In this 
Briefing Paper we take stock of these developments. 
We conclude that the overriding outcome is 
the consolidation of power in the central UK 
Government, raising significant - and still unresolved - 
constitutional and trade questions. 
THE POST-BREXIT FOOD STANDARDS 
JIGSAW
Post-Brexit food standards governance requires 
piecing together three new processes with very 
different – even opposite – implications:
(1) So-called secondary legislation that 
preserves and amends EU law – a category 
known as ‘retained EU law’
(2) A UK-wide food safety and standards 
‘common framework’
(3) The UK Internal Market Bill.
Under retained EU law (1), the devolved nations have 
powers to amend domestic food standards regulation 
independently of one another. These would allow, for 
example, Scotland to maintain a ban on the dreaded 
‘chlorinated chicken’ even if England decided to allow 
it. 
The developing common framework (2) aims to 
counter this problem by creating unified standards 
informed by a collaborative risk assessment process. 
This process is driven by cooperation and consent 
and it is ongoing. Through this process, England, 
Scotland and Wales can agree to maintain a unified 
1  IPPR, Public willing to sacrifice US trade deal to protect food 
safety (07.04.18): https://www.ippr.org/news-and-media/press-
releases/public-willing-to-sacrifice-us-trade-deal-to-protect-food-safety . 
Which, National Trade Conversation (Nov 2020): https://campaigns.
which.co.uk/trade-deals/national-trade-conversation/
approach to the risk assessment underlying the ban 
on chlorinated chicken.
Finally, the Internal Market Bill (IM Bill) (3), like the 
common framework, also attempts to deal with 
regulatory divergence but in a completely different 
way: by requiring, with very narrow exceptions, all 
devolved nations to import and sell food products 
(alongside other products and services) from all other 
devolved nations. This means that if England decided 
to allow chlorinated chicken, Scotland wouldn’t 
be able to prevent such chicken from being sold in its 
shops, even if it maintained a domestic ban. The IM 
Bill also challenges arrangements for Northern Ireland 
made in the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement; to avoid 
introducing even more complexity, we sidestep those 
issues here.
In the subsequent sections, we say a bit more about 
each of these areas and how they fit together. 
RETAINED EU LAW: CONSOLIDATING 
POWER BUT ALLOWING DIVERGENCE
In our previous analysis2 of retained EU law for 
specific areas of food law – pesticides, GMOs and 
food hygiene – we noted that these follow a similar 
trend: while retained EU law initially maintains EU 
rules, ministers are provided with powers to make 
new rules in these areas. These powers would 
enable ministers to lower levels of protection for 
public and environmental health in the UK without 
full parliamentary scrutiny and with weakened 
requirements to take account of independent 
scientific risk assessment. 
These changes consolidate power, but they also 
devolve power far beyond what was permitted under 
EU rules: England, Wales and Scotland could all have 
their own separate approach to food standards. If they 
did, questions would arise about how to maintain an 
open UK internal market,  in other words, how would 
farmers and food producers cope with many different 
requirements in different nations in the UK, and would 
we need border checks at Gretna Green3 or along 
the River Dee to prevent products banned in England 
from entering Scotland and Wales or vice versa? It 
is precisely this problem that the subsequent two 
processes address, though in very different ways. 
2  UKTPO Briefing Paper 39: https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/
publications/brexit-food-safety-legislation-and-potential-implications-
for-uk-trade-the-devil-in-the-details/
3  UKTPO blog: ‘Border posts at Gretna Green? Loosening food 
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COMMON FRAMEWORKS: FOOD LAW 
MADE THROUGH COLLABORATIVE 
EFFORT
In the past, EU rules provided the ‘glue’ of the UK’s 
internal market, largely by harmonising rules for 
product standards, which may, after 31 December 
2020, be amended at the discretion of Ministers 
under the retained EU law described above. The need 
to replace this potentially divergent system with a 
unified approach to food law has been recognised 
by both the UK Government and the devolved 
administrations.
The Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) is the main 
mechanism for inter-governmental cooperation in the 
UK. A JMC sub-committee was formed in response 
to Brexit in October 2017 and set out principles 
for cooperation between the UK Government and 
devolved nations on developing UK-wide legislative 
frameworks. The Government’s latest analysis4 
identified 154 areas where there may be a need to 
establish UK-wide ‘common frameworks’ including 
food and feed safety law.
The Food and Feed Safety and Hygiene (FFSH) 
common framework is currently in the consultation 
phase. The most recent public statement5 of this 
framework suggests the aim is currently for food and 
feed law and policy to be ‘as unified as possible, 
while allowing for evidence-based divergence in the 
public interest’ and that policy development is to be 
delivered through collaboration and ‘a shared risk 
analysis process’. It seems much effort has been 
devoted to agreeing this common framework and 
Food Standards Scotland’s response6 to the Internal 
Market (IM) Bill indicates there is frustration that this 
work was under threat.
Some common frameworks are described as 
‘legislative frameworks’ – but the meaning of this 
isn’t entirely clear. Whilst common frameworks refer 
to specific areas of legislation, they do not tie down 
devolved nations to specific legislative commitments, 
but rather establish broad principles and create fora 
for discussion and dispute resolution. If there was a 
4  Frameworks Analysis 2020 Breakdown of areas of EU law that 




5  Food Standards Agency Board meeting – 16 September 2020: 
https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/media/document/fsa-
20-09-04-food-and-feed-safety-and-hygiene.pdf
6  Food Standards Scotland, ‘Food Standards Scotland shares 
concerns over UK Internal Market Bill’: https://www.foodstandards.
gov.scot/news-and-alerts/food-standards-scotland-shares-concerns-
over-uk-internal-market-bill
dispute about common frameworks (for example, if 
one country wanted to change its food standards and 
the others disagreed), there is a strong emphasis 
on consultation to resolve things amicably. If 
consultation fails, disputes ultimately go to the JMC 
dispute resolution mechanism,7 but the JMC is a 
consultative, not executive body; its decisions are 
non-binding. In this sense, ultimately, the glue holding 
together the UK’s internal market is cooperation and 
goodwill. 
THE INTERNAL MARKET BILL: 
DIVERGENCE WITH A TWIST
The IM Bill introduces a more powerful statutory glue 
for the internal market, which binds quite differently. 
It preserves the newly-devolved powers in food 
standards we described above. However, the Bill 
introduces market access requirements for mutual 
recognition and non-discrimination that mean, in 
practice, that it de facto undermines devolved powers.
Why is this? Legislation that applies to, say, Scottish 
farmers or food producers can’t be used to prevent 
or condition the entry of goods from other devolved 
nations (other than Northern Ireland, a separate 
case), even if the regulatory requirements differ. 
Thus, English producers could competitively undercut 
devolved nation producers with higher standards 
(as higher food standards are more expensive to 
maintain), making it difficult for the devolved nations 
to maintain different regulations than England.
Perhaps even more significantly, the IM Bill’s mutual 
recognition principle applies not only to food produced 
in the UK, but also food imported into the UK (Part 
1, Ss 2(1)); this means that, if food produced to 
lower standards were allowed into England – say, as 
a result of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiation 
– devolved nations would also be required to import 
it. Trade negotiation is a power reserved to the 
central UK Government. Whilst the UK Government 
has committed to consulting with devolved nations 
where devolved areas are affected, the precise scope 
of their influence in trade negotiations remains 
undefined, an issue which has recently attracted 
controversy.8 
7  See note 5 and Protocol for avoidance and resolution of 
disputes – MoU 2001: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/62121/avoidance-resolution.pdf
8  G Cameron, ‘No seat for the devolved nations at trade talks’ 
(24.09.20 The Times): https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/no-seat-
for-devolved-nations-at-trade-deal-talks-qtzp69t7f
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The IM Bill’s market access provisions do contain 
exceptions. Exclusions to both mutual recognition and 
non-discrimination principles are set out in Schedule 
1. However, these are limited to ‘threats to human, 
animal or plant health’ – covering only movements 
of pests, outbreaks of foodborne illness or product 
recalls due to safety concerns. They do not include 
broader environmental or animal welfare concerns.9 
In contrast, EU rules allow Member States not to 
mutually-recognise imported goods for a much wider 
array of reasons.10 In the IM Bill, the list of permitted 
exceptions can be modified – either expanded or 
contracted - by the Secretary of State, such that 
devolved nations have little control. The Lords' 
Amendment 17 proposes to remove these powers for 
the Secretary of State.11 
The Government recently amended the list to include 
fertilisers and approval of new active substances 
for pesticides. However, it didn’t exempt maximum 
residue levels (MRL) for pesticides, making the 
addition of pesticides meaningless in practice. This 
is because, when food moves across borders, what 
can be measured and restricted is the amount of 
residue it contains. Because other devolved nations’ 
MRLs have to be ‘mutually recognised’, if approved 
pesticides diverge, Scotland, Wales and England 
won’t be able to exert any control over what types of 
pesticides their consumers ingest. Thus, the rationale 
for including this exemption is unclear. 
The question then arises of whether devolved nations 
could introduce food labels to ensure that at least 
their consumers were aware that they were eating, 
say, chlorinated chicken or food with residues of 
pesticides that were banned domestically. There 
is a common framework for labelling,12 under 
which nations as a whole could decide that certain 
previously prohibited products need labels. However, 
the IM Bill’s mutual recognition principle, which 
stipulates that legal compliance in one devolved 
nation constitutes legal compliance in the others, 
9  A useful discussion of the exemptions can be found in P Oliver, 
'Goods in the UK internal market: a closer look at the exception 
clauses' (12.10.20 EU Relations Law): https://eurelationslaw.com/
blog/goods-in-the-uk-internal-market-a-closer-look-at-the-exception-
clauses 
10  Article 36 TFEU lists: ‘public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and 
commercial property'.
11 House of Lords Amendments (12.11.20): https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/58-01/150/5801150-II.pdf
12  Nutrition Related Labelling, Composition and Standards 




also applies to labelling requirements. This means 
that one devolved nation couldn’t unilaterally impose 
labelling requirements on products imported from 
another, as this would constitute an additional import 
requirement. This is further supported by the IM Bill’s 
White Paper, which explicitly highlights a requirement 
to comply with another devolved nation’s ‘more 
stringent labelling regime’ as the type of regulatory 
cost that the IM Bill intends to prevent.13 (Another 
important point about labelling requirements is that 
many of these foods may be processed into others – 
for example, chicken nuggets). 
HOW DO THESE PIECES FIT TOGETHER?
Whilst this is complex, there is a unifying theme: 
centralisation of power. Even where power is devolved, 
England’s status as the dominant market power 
combined with central UK Government oversight over 
trade negotiations (a reserved, not devolved, power) 
gives England outsize influence in shaping UK-wide 
food standards, undermining permitted divergence.
The core of any approach to an internal market as 
integrated as the UK’s should clearly be harmonised 
rules with a strong joint consultative process 
underlying them – they can’t be set by just one of 
the nations. The EU provides quite a formalised 
legislative approach to achieving this, which involves 
all EU bodies. The EU’s approach to maintaining its 
internal market relies largely on harmonisation of the 
product standards required to achieve free movement of 
goods. In areas where Member States can diverge, they 
are obliged to mutually recognise each other’s goods, 
subject to some exceptions. 
The UK is trying to replicate this with a set of cooperative 
commitments that are not as clearly underpinned by 
legislative requirements, i.e. common frameworks. 
The crux of the problem is the weakness of common 
frameworks vis-à-vis the IM bill. As Gravey argues,14 
the UK is replacing an approach governed by positive 
integration – that is to say, harmonisation of standards 
– with an approach that puts all its legal weight behind 
negative integration – that is to say, market access 
requirements.  
The recent formulation of the FFSH common framework 
acknowledges the relationship between the common 
framework and the Internal Market Bill is unresolved, 
distinguishing between the ‘legislative IM approach’ 
13  BEIS, UK Internal Market (July 2020), p78:https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/901225/uk-internal-market-white-paper.pdf
14  V Gravey, ‘The Internal Market Bill: why negative integration is 
causing such negative feelings’ (16.10.20 Brexit & Environment): 
https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2020/10/16/internal-market-
bill-why-negative-integration-is-causing-such-negative-feelings/
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and the common frameworks, and suggesting they 
would ‘operate at different levels to provide complete 
coverage’. Food Standards Scotland has strongly 
questioned the application of the Internal Market Bill 
to food and feed law, suggesting this third legislative 
framework is unnecessary. The Select Committee on 
the Constitution’s report on the Internal Market Bill 
also doubts the need for the Bill: “The Government has 
failed to explain why a combination of retained EU law, 
its existing powers to amend that law, and common 
frameworks could not provide the certainty required at 
the end of the transition period to secure an effective 
UK internal market. Such an approach would obviate the 
need for the Bill.”15
This tension in turn increases poor relations and 
mistrust, and may even make divergence in food 
standards more likely. Scotland has stated its aim of 
‘keeping pace’ with EU law and has proposed legislation 
to do so.16 Given the stated importance of ‘taking 
back control’ of UK regulation, the UK will at some 
point diverge from the EU. This also challenges the 
maintenance of common frameworks. 
15  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, United 
Kingdom Internal Market Bill (17th Report of Session 2019–21 
HL Paper 151), para 62: https://committees.parliament.uk/
publications/3025/documents/28707/default/




If common frameworks fall apart, newly-permitted 
divergence perversely works against devolved nations. 
England can unilaterally set and export whatever 
set of food regulation it wishes, making much more 
radical changes than would have been allowed in the 
EU’s Single Market, with little incentive for Scotland 
and Wales to maintain divergence. For this reason, 
and its expansion of powers reserved to the central 
UK Government, the devolved nations have refused to 
consent to the IM Bill.17  
Under the current arrangements, the only way to 
prevent the regulatory preferences of devolved nations 
being overruled by the heavy-handed application 
of the IM Bill is through cooperation and goodwill. 
Assuming that neither is in great supply right now, 
formalising the influence of devolved nations would 
be an important step toward preserving the Union 
post-Brexit. This could happen through making clear 
that market access principles supplement rather than 
override common frameworks (Lords' Amendment 
1) and decreasing the discretionary power of the 
Secretary of State (Lords' Amendment 7).18
Other options include:
• Strengthening commitments to maintain 
alignment with the core EU-derived precautionary 
approach to food standards that has provided 
coherence between devolved nations; 
• Introducing primary legislation for core food 
standards areas, making it harder to change this 
legislation without debate and scrutiny (an issue 
we have addressed in more depth in a previous 
blog19 ) and 
• Giving the devolved nations stronger oversight 
over national-level FTA commitments.
17  Business News ‘Scotland and Wales say British government’s 
bill threatens UK unity’ https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-
wales-idUKKBN2600QR 
18 UK Parliament, Lords votes to amend the UK Internal Market 
Bill (19.11.20): https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2020/
october/lords-debates-internal-market-bill/
19 'UK food safety Statutory Instruments: A problem for US-UK 
negotiations?’ (12.09.19 UKTPO): https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/
uktpo/2019/09/12/uk-food-safety-statutory-instruments-a-problem-
for-us-uk-negotiations/ 
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The UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO), a 
partnership between the University of Sussex and 
Chatham House, is an independent expert group 
that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade 
policy proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and 
other interested parties through tailored training 
packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide 
variety of stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s 
international trading environment is reconstructed 
in a manner that benefits all in Britain and is fair 
to Britain, the EU and the world. The Observatory 
offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, 
international organisations and businesses to 
strategise and develop new trade policies in the 
post-Brexit era.
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